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INTRODUCTION 
THE  field  of  development  lacks  a core  body  of  deductive  theory;  it 
proceeds  inductively  instead.  To account  for  development,  scholars 
often  draw lessons  from  history:  they  extrapolate  from  what  is "known" 
to  have  happened  in  the  past.  As a consequence,  the  field  belongs  as much 
to  historians  as it  does to  social  scientists. 
In a field  without  theory,  precedents  assume  the  status  of  laws. In the 
development  field,  it  is  the  historians  who  process  the  case  materials  from 
which  law-like  statements  are  drawn.  Historians  infer  the  lessons  that  be- 
come  the  new  orthodoxies.  Equally as important,  they  challenge  old ones. 
I  I wish  to  acknowledge  the  impact  of  Philip  Hoffman,  Kathryn  Norberg,  Hilton Root, 
Robert  Brenner,  Douglas North,  Roger  Schofield,  Eleanor  Searle,  Peter  Lange,  Michael  Gil- 
lespie,  John  Aldrich,  William  Bianco,  and  Margaret  Levi on  my  thinking.  I hasten  to  add that 
none  are responsible  for  the  viewpoints  in  this  article. 
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For the  development  theorist,  the  implication  is  clear:  keep  a vigilant  eye 
on the  work  of  historians. 
If  specialists  in the  field  were  asked to  appraise  competing  definitions 
of  development,  one of  the  most  popular  surely  would be: development 
is the  process  by  which  town  replaces  country  and industry  replaces  ag- 
riculture.  Key works  at  theorizing  in  the  development  field  focus  on this 
transition. 
In the  contemporary  literature,  many  scholars  proceed cross-section- 
ally:  the  development  field  remains  a branch  of  comparative  politics,  and 
scholars  arrive  at  theories  by  contrasting  behavior  in  present-day  agrarian 
and industrial  societies.  But the  grand theorists  of development-Max 
Weber,  Adam Smith,  Karl Marx,  and others-proceeded longitudinally. 
The theories  they  bequeathed  the  field  evolved  from  studying  how,  in  so- 
cieties  that  had developed  successfully,  town  had emerged  from  country, 
industry  from  agriculture,  and mature  capitalism  from  its  agrarian  ante- 
cedents. 
This essay  examines  some recent  works  that  focus  on this  transition. 
Recognizing  that  in this  field  history  stands  as parent  to  theory,  we shall 
conduct  a critical  inquiry  into  several  of  the  key  lessons  that  have been 
drawn. We shall see that  resistance  to the  market  was not led by  rural 
communities,  but  by  the  agents  of  capitalism;  that  peasants  (particularly 
wealthy ones) often sought to champion private rights  in property, 
whereas  elites  promoted  collective  ones;  and that  the  historical  shifting  of 
the  terms  of  trade  against  agriculture,  which  heralded  the  ascendancy  of 
the  commercial  classes,  has been  deeply  misunderstood. 
Above all, I shall  argue  that,  by  focusing  on the  case of  England, clas- 
sical  and Marxian  theorists  have based development  studies  on data that 
are  profoundly  misleading.  Differing  in  critical  respects  both  from  its  his- 
torical  contemporaries  and from  the  developing  nations  today,  the  Eng- 
lish  case supports  invalid  inferences.  Rather,  it  is the  French case from 
which  the  lessons  of  history  should  be drawn. 
COMMUNAL  RESISTANCE TO THE RISE  OF CAPITALISM 
Influential  I9th-century theorists  held that pre-industrial  societies 
were founded  on principles  that  contrasted  with  those  of  market-based 
societies:  in the words of Toennies, Gemeinschaft  as opposed to Gesell- 
schaft,  or, in the  words of Durkheim,  "mechanical" as opposed to "or- 
ganic" solidarity.'  Marx contrasted  natural  societies,  where value was 
' Ferdinand  Toennies,  Community  and  Society,  trans.  and ed. by  Charles  B. Loomis (East 
Lansing: Michigan  State  University  Press,  1937);  Emile Durkheim,  The  Division  of  Labor in 
Society  (New York:  Free  Press,  I956). 
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conferred  by  use,  with  market  societies,  where  value  was  determined  by 
exchange.2  The distinction  also figures  in the work of such influential 
non-Marxian  theorists  as Polanyi  and Parsons.3 
Contemporary  scholars  remain convinced  that  the principles  which 
underlie agrarian societies  contrast  with the principles  which govern 
market-based  societies.  Some have used this  "lesson  of  history"  to  create 
a theory  of  political  violence.  Wolf,  Migdal,  and Scott,  for  example,  have 
located the  origin  of  agrarian  rebellion  in efforts  to resist  the  impact  of 
the  market.4  The market,  they  hold,  threatens  the  very  foundations  of  ru- 
ral  community.  It  promotes  self-interest  and violates  basic  notions  of  hu- 
man welfare  in agrarian  societies,  such  as the  guarantee  of subsistence. 
Thus, its  spread  is  resisted  by  peasant  communities. 
These scholars  maintain  that,  in  part,  the  triumph  of  the  market  is  as- 
sured  by  its  possession  of  an active  ally:  the  nation-state.  In the  contem- 
porary  period,  for  example,  the  spread of market  forces  has been pro- 
moted by imperialism.  In the reigning  orthodoxy  of peasant studies, 
peasant rebellions  thus  become communalistic  rebellions,  representing 
forms  of  protest  against  the  market.  And while  they  are  profoundly  anti- 
capitalist,  they  are clothed  in  the  rhetoric  of  nationalism,  as they  also en- 
tail  resistance  against  foreign  political  domination. 
In The Contentious  French,  Charles  Tilly-a  historian  and sociologist 
who  has  made well-known  contributions  to  the  development  field5-per- 
petuates  important  strands  of  the  contemporary  orthodoxy.  But,  by  lov- 
ingly  exploring  a rich  tableau  of  historical  data,  he opens  the  door to  re- 
visionists.  For the  lessons  that  he reaffirms  appear to  be contested  by  the 
facts  that  he uncovers. 
Tilly's  mission,  he states,  is  to  address  the  question,  "How did the  de- 
velopment  of  capitalism  and the  concentration  of  power in the  national 
state  affect  the  ways  that  ordinary  people contended-or  failed  to con- 
tend-for their  interests?"  (p. 5). His answer  is  that  the  intrusion  of  cap- 
italism  and the  nation-state  led to protests  in early  modern  France that 
represented  the  reassertion  of  community.  This lesson,  he argues,  is  most 
2 Karl Marx, Capital (New York: Clark A. Kerr,  i906),  and esp. Grundrisse  [Outlines] 
(Harmondsworth,  England: Penguin  Books,  I973). 
3Karl  Polanyi,  The Great  Transformation  (Boston:  Beacon Press,  I957);  Talcott Parsons, 
The  Social  System  (New York:  Free  Press,  i964). 
4Eric  R. Wolf,  Peasant  Wars  of  the  Twentieth  Century  (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
i969);  James  C. Scott,  The  Moral  Economy  of  the  Peasant:  Peasant  Rebellion  and  Subsistence  in 
Southeast  Asia (New Haven and London: Yale University  Press,  I973);  Joel  S. Migdal,  Peas- 
ants,  Politics,  and Revolution  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  I974).  For more  recent 
works,  see Eric R. Wolf,  Europe  and  the  People  Without  History  (Berkeley  and Los Angeles: 
University  of California  Press,  i982),  and James  C. Scott,  Weapons  of  the Weak:  Everyday 
Forms  of  Peasant  Resistance  (New Haven and London: Yale University  Press,  i985). 
5See,  for  example,  Charles  Tilly,  ed., The  Formation  of  National  States  in Western  Europe 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  I975). 
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vividly  conveyed  by  a characteristic  form  of  political  protest,  the  grain 
riot:  "Blockage  of  grain  expressed  the  demand  of  ordinary  people  that  the 
needs  of  the  community  take  priority  over  the  requirements  of  the  mar- 
ket"  (pp.  2I-22). 
As  Tilly's  own  work-and the  work  of  others-has  confirmed,  polit- 
ical  demands  for  subsistence  were  indeed  characteristic  of  European  so- 
ciety  in  the  early  modern  period.  Local  communities  faced  with  shortages 
of  food  and  rising  prices  used  political  power  to  prevent  the  shipment  of 
the  grain  that  could  meet  their  needs  for  subsistence.6 
The key  questions,  however,  are:  Did these  protests  represent  revolts 
against  the  market?  Did they  represent  revolts  against  the  market's  pu- 
tative  ally,  the  state?  In  short,  did  they  represent  a revolt  by  precapitalist 
political  communities? 
For  the  conventional  interpretation  to  hold,  two  things  must  be  true. 
One  is  that  those  who  entered  the  rural  community  to  procure  grain  must 
have  been  agents  of  the  market.  The other  is  that  the  state  officials  who 
backed  them  must  be  champions  of  the  market. 
Tilly's  data,  and  the  data  of  others,  show  that  it  was  often  the  levies  of 
the  armed  forces  that  precipitated  the  grain  riots;  the  military  had  little 
incentive  to pay high prices  for  food (Tilly, 83ff.).7  Other levies were 
made  to  provision  Paris.  Like Tilly,  Robert  Brenner  ("Agrarian  Class 
Structure  and  Economic  Development  in  Pre-Industrial  Europe,"  chap. 
I, pp. IO-63,  in  Aston  and Philpin)  relates  that  the  French  monarchy  fre- 
quently  mounted  wars  against  the  regional  nobility.  Its  power  base  usu- 
ally  rested  narrowly  on  Paris.  The  bureaucracy,  the  armed  forces,  and  the 
aristocracy  also  were  concentrated  in  Paris.  And  the  residents  of  Paris  de- 
manded  cheap  food. 
Kaplan (1976) recounts  that,  in  order  to  feed  Paris,  the  government  de- 
veloped  an elaborate  bureaucracy  for  securing  food  from  the  country- 
side.8  Its  purpose  was  not  only  to  feed  Paris,  but  to  do  so  at  low  prices- 
in  other  words,  to  counter  market  forces.  It  sought  to  purchase  the  grain 
at  prices  cheaper  than  those  offered  by  consumers  living  in  regional  mar- 
kets-or abroad. 
6 See,  for  example,  the  materials  in  Tilly  (fn.  5); Louise A. Tilly,  "The Food Riot  as a Form 
of  Political  Conflict  in  France,"  Journal  of  Interdisciplinary  History  2  (I97I),  23-57,  and J.  Ste- 
venson,  "Food Riots  in England,  1792-i8i8"  in  R. Quinault  and J.  Stevenson,  eds.,  Popular 
Protest  and  Public  Order:  Six  Studies  in  British  History  (London: George  Allen  & Unwin,  I974). 
Critical  to  the  interpretation  of  these  riots  is  Edward P. Thompson,  "The Moral  Economy  of 
the  English  Crowd in  the  Eighteenth  Century,"  Pastand  Present  52  (971),  76-I36,  and  George 
Rude,  "La taxation  populaire  de mai  I775  a Paris  et  dans  la region  Parisienne"  [The common 
taxation  of  May I775  in Paris  and in the  Paris  region],  Annales  Historiques  de la Revolution 
Franpaise 28  (1956),  I39-79. 
7 See also the  materials  in  Louise Tilly  (fn.  6),  and Stevenson  (fn.  6). 
8 For the  correlation  between  unrest  and the  price  of  food,  see  George  Rude,  Paris  and  Lon- 
don  in  the  Eighteenth  Century  (London: Collins,  I970). 
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The image  that  Tilly  conveys  is  that  of  the  state  actively  promoting  the 
formation  of markets  and thereby  provoking  communal unrest  in the 
agrarian  hinterland.  In keeping  with  the  orthodox  strain  of contempo- 
rary  peasant  studies,  he therefore  interprets  grain  riots  as a form  of  com- 
munal protest  against  the  rise  of  capitalism,  with  the  latter  being  cham- 
pioned  by  the  market  and the  state.  But  the  principal  demanders  of  food 
were  not  agencies  of  the  market;  they  were  agencies  of  the  state-the mil- 
itary  or the bureaucracy  who sought  to override  the  operations  of the 
market,  rather  than to promote  them.  They wanted food at cheaper 
prices  than  the  unregulated  market  would provide. 
The composition  of  the  groups  who resisted  the  export  of  grain  con- 
stitutes  a further  challenge  to the  orthodox  view. Tilly's language,  and 
that  of  his colleagues  in the  field  of  peasant  studies,  suggests  that  it  was 
agrarian  communities  who resisted  the  intrusion  of  the  market  and thus, 
implicitly,  the  rise  of  capitalism.  But  neither  logic  nor  evidence  bears  out 
such  an interpretation.  Rather,  both  suggest  that  the  enemies  of  the  grain 
trade  would be the  creatures  of  capitalism-the nascent  bourgeoisie  and 
the  proletariat-rather  than  the  relics  of  the  pre-capitalist  past,  the  agrar- 
ian producers.9 
Logic suggests  that  the  consumers  rather  than  the  producers  would re- 
sist  the  export  of  grain,  for  exports  would lead to a rise  in local prices. 
Although  in times  of  drought  or  crop  failure,  the  grain  producers  them- 
selves  became net  consumers  and then  had reason  to  resist  food  exports, 
most  often  they  were  suppliers.  If  they  could obtain  higher  prices  by  ex- 
porting  grain  from  the  local community,  they  would presumably  favor 
grain  exports. 
It is  relevant,  therefore,  that  historians  have  found  that  food  riots  took 
place long after  the end of subsistence  crises in both England and 
France.Io  Moreover,  these  riots  were led by consumers,  not producers: 
members  of  the  new  urban  populations  that  had grown  up in  the  regional 
centers  of  England and France.  Thus, Stevenson  writes  that  food  riots  in 
England tended to take place in towns,  communication  centers,  and 
ports.  They usually  occurred  in areas  of  mining  and quarrying;  in areas 
where  workers  and builders  were  constructing  canals,  dykes,  and roads; 
9  The picture  is  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  members  of  the  aristocracy  who lived 
in  Paris  also  owned  land  in  the  grain-growing  areas.  In their  capacity  as  local  elites,  they  often 
ruled  against  the  right  of  grain  "exports"  to Paris  and in favor  of  the  paramountcy  of  local 
markets.  The political  interests  of  the  aristocracy  thus  conflicted  with  their  economic  interests 
in shipping  grain  to high-priced  markets;  and their  interests  as producers,  which  were  en- 
hanced by  high  prices,  conflicted  with  their  interests  as urban  consumers,  which  were en- 
hanced  by  low  prices.  These complexities  should  make  the  analyst  suspicious  of  any  simplistic 
rendering  of  the  class  interests  of  the  aristocracy. 
1o  For France,  see Louise Tilly (fn.  6),  25.  Stevenson  too stresses  that  food  riots  occurred 
even  after  subsistence  crises  had  ended  in  England  (fn.  6,  pp.  4off.). 
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and among the rural  workers.  Louise Tilly finds  that  in i8th-century 
Burgundy,  "within  the  province,  which  was quickly  tapped  by  the  large 
military  and urban  consumers,  smaller  cities  sought  food  and the  coun- 
tryside  armed  to  prevent  loss  of  vital  supplies.  'There was open war with 
the  peasants  to  get  their  grain,'  wrote  a canon  of  Beaune.""- 
Too often,  the  lesson  that  is  drawn  seems  to  indicate  that  rural,  agrar- 
ian interests  fight  against the penetration  of the market,  particularly 
when the  market  threatens  basic  food  supplies  and creates  crises  of  sub- 
sistence.  Historically,  there  have  indeed  been  political  struggles  over  food 
supplies.  But those  who imperiled  local subsistence  most  often  were  not 
agents  of  the  market;  rather,  they  were  agents  of  interests  that  sought  to 
override  market  forces.  Often,  those  who resisted  the  export  of  food  sup- 
plies were not the  members  of the  agrarian  community;  the resistance 
tended to come from  the  local consumers  rather  than  the  producers  of 
food.12  And food  riots  continued  even  after  subsistence  crises  subsided. 
The agents  of  the  new capitalism-the workers,  artisans,  burghers,  as 
well  as those  who  governed  them-cloaked their  demands  for  cheap  food 
in the  myth  of  the  precapitalist  community.  Kaplan shows  that  agrarian 
interests-the  producers  of  grain-trumpeted the  virtues  of  "liberty  and 
the  market"  and called for  the  end of  irrational  "feudal fetters"  on the 
market's  operations  (Kaplan, 1976, I, pp. ii4ff.). Clearly,  key  lessons  of 
history  must  be unlearned. 
PEASANTS AS COMMUNITARIANS 
Another  so-called  lesson  of  history  is  that,  with  the  transition  from  an 
agrarian  to  an industrial  society,  peasants  tend  to  experience  a loss  in  wel- 
fare.  It  is  held that  capitalism  promotes  the  formation  of  private  rights  in 
property;  and that,  with  the  privatization  of  common  rights,  poor  people 
lose their  institutional  defenses  against  the  risks  of  the  market.  For this 
reason  too,  the  rural  poor  are  said  to  rebel  and resist  the  rise  of  capitalism. 
This interpretation  has been put forward  for  peasant rebellions  in 
France.'3  It has been applied to the  study  of  rural  violence  in England, 
Louise Tilly  (fn.  6),  52. 
As noted  above, members  of the  agrarian  community  would on occasion be net  pur- 
chasers  of  food,  and therefore  would resist  higher  prices  for  it.  This was particularly  true  of 
cottagers  and farm  laborers,  who at times  of  subsistence  crises  faced  both  a lowering  of  the 
wage rate  and higher  food  prices;  they  would  therefore  be  particularly  motivated  to  resist  the 
"exportation"  of  food.  For  a brilliant  analysis,  see  Amartya  Sen,  Poverty  and  Famines:  An  Essay 
on  Entitlement  and  Deprivation  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  I  98  I). 
'3 Marc Bloch,  French  Rural  History,  trans.  by  Janet  Sondheimer  (Berkeley  and Los Ange- 
les: University  of  California  Press,  I970);  Emmanuel Le Roy  Ladurie,  Histoire  de la France 
Rurale  [History  of  rural  France],  ed. by  Georges  Duby and Armand  Wallon,  4 vols.  (Paris: 
Seuil, I976);  Albert  Soboul, "Problkmes  paysannes  de la communaute  rurale  (xviiie-xixe)" 
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especially  at  the  time  of  the  Parliamentary  enclosures.'4  And,  as a "lesson 
of  history,"  it  has been applied to the  study  of  peasant  rebellions  in the 
modern  world.'5 
Again,  Tilly  perpetuates  this  orthodoxy.  He argues  that: 
The second  common  form  of  anti-capitalist  action  was  ... local  resistance 
to  landlords'  consolidation  of  lands  and  of  rights  in  the  land  (p.  23). 
Popular  opposition  did not  aim specifically  at the  landed  nobility.  It 
aimed  at  the  landlords  of  any  order  who  chewed  up  the  rural  community's 
collective  rights  (p.  24). 
But who actually  promoted  the preservation  of collective  rights?  In 
some cases, to be sure,  it was the  peasants.  But the  more we learn,  the 
more  we come  to  realize  that  the  defenders  of  common  rights  were  often 
drawn  from  the  ranks  of  others. 
Some came from  the elites  who dominated village institutions  and 
thereby  captured  the  benefits  of  common  property.'6  Important  work  by 
Philip Hoffman  shows that,  in Northern  and Eastern  France, herders 
constituted  the primary  opponents of private enclosure. Landlords, 
wealthy  peasants,  and local seigneurs  usually  owned these  herds.  They 
also tended  to  hold the  right  to  stint  on common  lands,  and to  exercise  it 
because they  feared  the  loss  of  grazing  privileges.'7  Kathryn  Norberg  ar- 
gues in  a study  of  a village  in  southwestern  France: 
The commons  ... profited  mainly  the  elite  who  jealously  guarded  its  ben- 
efits.... they  were  the  principal  beneficiaries  of  most  traditional  practices, 
be  they  open  fields  or  communal  woods.  No wonder  then  that  they  were 
among  traditions'  strongest  defenders.  ...  historians  have  mistaken  the 
elite's  views  for  those  of  the  whole  community.'8 
[Peasant  problems  of  the  rural  community,  i8th-i9th  century],  in  Problemes  paysannes  de la 
Revolution  1778-1848 (Paris:  Maspero,  I975). 
'4 J.  L. and Barbara  Hammond,  The  Village  Laborer  1760-1832 (New York: Harper  Torch- 
books,  I970);  Edward P. Thompson,  The  Making  of  the  English  Working  Class  (New York: 
Vintage  Books,  i962). 
'  See,  for  example,  Scott  (fn.  4,  I974). 
i6 This  line  of  historical  interpretation  was  provided  by  Alfred  Cobban  in  The  Social  History 
of  the  French  Revolution  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  i968).  In addition  to  the 
recent  work  of  Norberg  and Hoffman  (fns.  I7,  i8, and i9),  see Root's  discussion  in  Peasants 
and  King,  pp. i  6,  95-97, I 25,  I53ff,  and  2I6-  I  7. 
'7Philip  T. Hoffman,  "Institutions  and Agriculture  in Old-Regime  France,"  paper pre- 
pared for  the  Caltech-All  University  of  California  Group in Economic  History  Conference 
on Pre-Industrial  Developments  in  Peasant  Economies  (Huntington  Library,  Pasadena,  CA), 
May  22-24,  i987. 
,8 Kathryn  Norberg,  "The Struggle  Over the  Commons: Antiseigneurialism  and Social 
Tension in  the  Peasant  Community,"  pp.  26-27.  The work  of  Hoffman  (fn.  I7) and Norberg 
(fns.  i8 and i9)  is  to  be featured  in  a special  edition  of  the  journal  Politics  and  Society,  edited 
by  Margaret  Levi and Robert  H. Bates. Also see Samuel L. Popkin,  The Rational  Peasant 
(Berkeley  and Los Angeles:  University  of  California  Press,  I979),  which  makes  a comparable 
argument  based  on data  from  contemporary  Vietnam. 
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In France,  the  local elites  had an important  ally:  the  central  adminis- 
trators.  Under  a law passed  in  1439,  the  monarchy  could  tax  the  peasantry 
directly  and without  convoking  the  Estates  General. Locked in combat 
with  the  nobility  and distrustful  of  other  elites,  the  king  was afraid  to  ne- 
gotiate  for  revenues  with  privileged  orders.  Instead,  he sought  to secure 
his tax base by  preventing  encroachments  upon peasant  property.  This 
ability  to  tap  the  streams  of  income  generated  by  the  peasant  communities 
played  another  critical  role  in  the  state's  finances:  it  underwrote  the  mon- 
arch's  capacity  to repay-and  thus  to  attract-foreign  loans. This argu- 
ment  forms  the  central  thesis  of  Hilton Root's  Peasants  and  King in  Bur- 
gundy.  Root  draws  the  important  implication: 
Communal  rights  and  properties  and  collective  responsibility  for  tax  col- 
lection  were  not  spontaneous  expressions  of  peasant  culture.  Both  were 
measures  imposed  from  above  to  ensure  political  dominance  of  the  agrar- 
ian  population  and  to  facilitate  resource  extraction  (pp.  232-33). 
Perhaps  we have  gone  too  far.  What,  after  all,  do we know  of  the  pref- 
erences  of the peasants?  Do  we have any insight  into  what they  them- 
selves  would have  preferred?  We do,  at  least  to  a modest  degree.  Norberg 
has gained access to the  response  of  431  peasant  communities  to a law 
passed after  the French Revolution,  which allowed peasants  to divide 
common  land into  private  holdings.  She concludes  that,  when  given  the 
chance to break up the  commons,  peasant  villages  elected  to do so.'9  In 
response  to  an investigation  of  the  implementation  of  this  law, the  gov- 
ernment  learned  that  even prior  to the  new policy,  240  villages  had de- 
cided to  divide  up the  commons;  i i8 voted  to  partition;  and only  46 had 
declined to do so.20  Most of  the  villages  that  elected  not  to  divide did so 
because their  commons  were too wet,  too dry,  or too hilly  to cultivate. 
Norberg  concludes,  "If  the  commons  had  not  been  encroached  upon,  they 
were,  most  likely,  virtually  worthless  and therefore  not  worth  partition- 
ing.  Here lay,  it  appears,  the  main  reason  peasants  chose  to  leave  the  com- 
mons  as collective  property."2I 
Too often,  people  in  the  development  field  seem  to  have  drawn  the  les- 
son that  local communities  struggle  against  the  privatization  of  interests 
brought  on by  capitalism,  and do so in  order  to  safeguard  the  interests  of 
the  poor.  Instead,  there  is  ample  historical  evidence  to  suggest  that  collec- 
tive  property  is  championed  by  elites  and that  it  affords  a way  of  privatiz- 
9  Kathryn  Norberg,  "Dividing up the  Commons:  The Political  Economy  of  Eighteenth- 
Century  French  Agriculture,"  paper prepared  for  the  Caltech-All  University  of  California 
Conference  (fn.  I7). 
2Twenty-seven  had  no  knowledge  of  the  law. 
Norberg  (fn.  I9), 7. 
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ing  the  benefits  to  be  extracted  from  agrarian  society  while  spreading  the 
costs  widely  among  its  members.  It  appears  that  champions  of  collective 
property  possess  private  interests  themselves,  and  use  the  corporate  inter- 
ests  of  the  rural  community  to  legitimate  their  claims.22 
PEASANT FARMING AS A RETARDANT  TO DEVELOPMENT 
Anyone  who  works  in  present-day  developing  areas  knows  that,  de- 
spite  overwhelming  evidence  to  the  contrary,  significant  elites  and  espe- 
cially  intellectuals  remain  convinced  that  peasant  farming  provides  an  in- 
adequate  foundation  for  development.  In  post-independence  Africa,  for 
example,  the  governments  of  Somalia,  Ethiopia,  Mozambique,  Zambia, 
Tanzania,  and  Ghana  have  invested  heavily  in  state  farms;  alternatively, 
through  "villagization"  or other  means,  they  have  sought  to promote 
large-scale  farming.23  In the  pre-independence  period,  the  governments 
of  Kenya  and  Rhodesia  determined,  as  a matter  of  policy,  not  to  rely  on 
the  output  of  peasant  farmers.  It  was  held  that,  in  view  of  their  commit- 
ment  to  subsistence,  peasant  farmers  produced  a highly  variable  level  of 
marketable  surplus,  thus  imposing  risks  upon  consumers  and  the  state.24 
Policy  makers  therefore  chose  to  rely  instead  upon  the  large-scale  farmers 
who,  they  believed,  produced  a more  reliable  flow  of  marketable  output. 
The superiority  of  the  large-scale  farmer  is  a lesson  of  history  drawn 
chiefly,  it  would  appear,  from  commentaries  on  the  i8th-century  rivalry 
between  the  superpowers  of  that  era:  England  and  France.  Influential  ob- 
servers  attributed  England's  military  superiority  in  large  part  to  her  eco- 
nomic  prosperity;  her  superior  wealth,  in  turn,  was  thought  to  be  due  to 
the  greater  productivity  of  her  agriculture;  and  the  last  was  believed  to  be 
based on the  greater  technical  and economic  efficiency  of England's 
large-scale  farmers.25  The retarded  state  of  the  French  economy  was  as- 
22 Also see the  discussion  in Robert  H. Bates,  "Some Conventional  Orthodoxies  in the 
Study of Agrarian Change,"  World  Politics  36 (January  1984),  234-54.  This is not to deny that 
there  were  cases  where  the  poor  depended  upon  common  rights,  for  pasture,  for  forest  prod- 
ucts,  or for  gleaning,  and where  they  allied  themselves  with  those  who resisted  the  break-up 
of  common  lands.  In general,  however,  it  appears  to  have  been  the  local  elites  who  dominated 
the  commons. 
23  See,  for  example,  the  discussion  in  Robert  H. Bates,  Markets  and  States  in Tropical  Africa 
(Berkeley  and Los Angeles:  University  of  California  Press,  i98i). 
24 See the  discussion  and review  of  this  debate  in  William  0. Jones,  Marketing  Stable  Food 
Crops  in Tropical  Africa  (Ithaca,  NY: Cornell  University  Press,  I972).  William  Allan,  The  Af- 
rican  Husbandman  (New York: Barnes  & Noble, i965)  remains  the  classic  argument  of  this 
position. 
25 The  intellectual  background  is brilliantly  presented  in Kaplan  (1976).  See also the 
thoughtful  review  in  Michael  Lipton,  Why  Poor  People  Stay  Poor:  Urban  Bias in World  Devel- 
opment  (Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  I977). 
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cribed  to  France's  lagging  rural  sector,  where  productivity  remained  low, 
technical  progress  insufficient,  and farm  size diminutive.  England had 
seized the capitalist  road to development;  France remained  backward, 
mired  in  peasant  production. 
This analysis  was championed  in a series  of  influential  works  by  Ar- 
thur  Young, published  in  the  i8th  century.26  It  was endorsed  by  the  lead- 
ing  economists  of  the  time,27  and exercised  a powerful  influence  upon  pol- 
icy makers-especially  in France, where the government  sought to 
reform  its  rural  economy  the  better  to  finance  its  military  ventures.28  Karl 
Marx helped  to  inject  this  analysis  into  contemporary  development  stud- 
ies. While condemning  the  stagnation  of  peasant  production,29  Marx at- 
tributed  the  initial  surge  toward  industrialization  to  the  rise  of  capitalist 
farming.30 
This lesson  of  history that  peasant  production  is inefficient  and in- 
capable of  generating  an agricultural  surplus  adequate for  the  promotion 
of development-continues to influence  the writings  of contemporary 
historians.  Among the  works  reviewed  here,  its  power is perhaps  most 
strikingly  underscored  by  Brenner's  compelling  re-analysis  of  the  decline 
of feudal society.  The triumph  of modern capitalism,  he argues, was 
marked  by  the  rise  of  commercial  farming:  large,  capital-intensive  farms, 
employing  wage labor.  States  in which  development  was retarded  were 
marked  instead  by  the  capacity  of  the  bureaucracy  and others  to  ally  with 
an organized peasantry  and to block the rise  of commercially  minded 
agrarian  classes: 
In  England  we  find  the  landlords  consolidating  holdings  and  leasing  them 
out  to  large  capitalist  tenants  who  would  in  turn  farm  them  on  the  basis  of 
wage  labor  and  agricultural  improvement.  But  in  France  we  find  compar- 
atively  little  consolidation.  Even  the  land  controlled  directly  by  the  land- 
lords-that  is  by  demesnes  farmed  out  on  terminable  contract  leases-was 
26 See Arthur  Young,  Six Weeks  Tour  Through  the  Southern  Counties  of  England  and Wales 
(London: W. Strahan,  I768); A Six  Months  Tour  Through  the  North  of  England,  2nd  ed. (Lon- 
don: W. Strahan,  I77i);  and  A Farmer's  Tour  Through  the  East  of  England  (London: W. Stra- 
han,  I77I). 
27  See Ronald L. Meek, The Economics  of  Physiocracy  (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press,  i963). 
28 Kaplan's work,  esp.  I976, provides  valuable  insights  into  the  influence  of  economic  tech- 
nocrats  upon  policy  making  in i8th-century  France.  Also see  Alexis  de Tocqueville,  The  Old 
Regime  and  the  French  Revolution,  trans.  by  Stuart  Gilbert  (New York: Anchor  Books,  I955). 
29 See the  materials  gathered  in  Norire  Ter-Akopyan,  ed.,  Marx,  Engels:  Pre-Capitalist  So- 
cio-economic  Formations  (London: Lawrence  & Wishart,  I979). 
3?Marx, Capital  (fn.  2), part  VIII. Subsequent  Marxian  theorists  attributed  the  relative  stag- 
nation  of  Eastern  and Central  Europe to  the  prevalence  of  peasant  agriculture;  they  located 
in  large-scale  farming  the  motor  force  for  the  rise  of  capitalism.  A useful  review  is  contained 
in David Mitrany,  Marx  Against  the  Peasant  (New York: Collier  Books,  i96i).  See also V. I. 
Lenin,  The  Development  of  Capitalism  in  Russia  (Moscow: Progress  Publishers,  I956). 
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generally  let  in  small  parcels  and cultivated  by  small  peasant  tenants.  At  the 
same time,  of  course,  fragmentation  dominated  the  sector  of  peasant  pro- 
prietorship.  These different  class structures  determined  substantially  dif- 
ferent  results  in  terms  of  agricultural  productivity  and, indeed,  wholly  dis- 
parate overall patterns  of economic development  (Brenner  in Aston and 
Philpin,  46). 
Students  of  contemporary  agriculture,  particularly  in Asia  Schultz, 
Hayami,  Ruttan,  Sen and others  have  largely  discredited  this  "lesson  of 
history."3'  More important  for  this  essay,  the  thesis  is strongly  disputed 
by  contemporary  historians  of agricultural  development  in Europe. As 
phrased  most  dramatically  by  Goldstone,  "There is  a persistent  belief. . . 
that  much  of  the  magic in English  farming  was due to  its  'larger'  farms, 
with  their  land lord/capitalist  tenant/wage  laborer,  compared with  the 
proliferation  of  tiny  plots  in  France.  This is,  to  be polite,  poppycock."32 
As the work of Robert  C. Allen and others  has shown,  there  was a 
steady  growth  of productivity  on all British  farms,  be they  enclosed or 
open-field,  large  or small,  from  the  time  of  the  middle  ages through  the 
I 8th  century;33  because  of  the  dominance  of  open-field  farming  through- 
out  much  of  this  period,34  enclosed,  large-scale  farmers  contributed  rela- 
tively  little  to the differences  in productivity  that  distinguished  British 
from  French  agriculture.35  According  to  Allen, 
Corn  yields  in  the  English  midlands  approximately  doubled  between  the 
middle  ages  and  the  nineteenth  century.  Wheat,  for  instance,  which  had 
yielded  about  ten  bushels  per  acre  in  the  fifteenth  century,  provided  about 
20-22  bushels  c. i8oo. Compared  to  that  increase,  the  difference  between 
open  and  enclosed  yields  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  was  small,  i.e. 
open  field  farmers  (like  enclosed  farmers)  had  accomplished  almost  all  of 
the  advance.36 
3' Theodore W. Schultz,  Transforming  Traditional  Agriculture  (New Haven and London: 
Yale University  Press,  i964);  Yujiro Hayami and Vernon  W. Ruttan,  Agricultural  Develop- 
ment:  An International  Perspective  (Baltimore  and London: The Johns  Hopkins University 
Press,  I971);  Amartya  K. Sen,  "Size of  Holding and Productivity,"  The  Economic  Weekly  i6 
(I964),  323-26. 
32 Jack  Goldstone,  "Regional  Ecology  and Agrarian  Change in  England  and France,  I500- 
I700,"  paper  presented  at  the  Caltech-All  University  of  California  Conference  (fn.  I7),  24.  A 
revised  version  of  this  paper  is  scheduled  to  appear  in  a special  edition  of  Politics  and  Society 
(see fn.  i8). 
33  Allen,  "Enclosure  and Productivity  Growth,  I459-i850,"  typescript  (Department  of  Eco- 
nomics,  University  of  British  Columbia,  i984). Allen's  data remain  controversial. 
34  For data  on the  rate  of  enclosure,  see  J.  R. Wordie,  "The Chronology  of  English  Enclo- 
sure  I500-I9I4,"  Economic  History  Review  36 (November  i983), 483-505. 
35  For data on these  differences,  see Anthony  Wrigley,  "Urban Growth  and Agricultural 
Change: England  and the  Continent  in  the  Early  Modern  Period,"  Journal  of  Interdisciplinary 
History  I5 (i985),  7i6-2I. 
36 Robert  C. Allen,  "Enclosure,  Farming  Methods,  and the  Growth  of  Productivity  in  the 
South Midlands,"  Discussion  Paper No. 86-44 (rev.)  (Department  of  Economics,  University 
of  British  Columbia,  January  i987),  i6. See also J.  A. Yelling,  Common  Field  and  Enclosure  in 
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To what,  then,  is  the  greater  English  productivity  to  be  attributed?  Al- 
len suggests  biological  improvements:  seed selection  and the  use of im- 
proved  plant  species.  Others  suggest  the  growth  of  the  market.  In Eng- 
land, to a much greater  degree than  in France, a national  market  had 
formed.  Some areas produced  wool for  export.  Areas immediately  adja- 
cent  to  towns  specialized  in  truck  farming  and the  production  of  perish- 
ables.37  Farms near  the  coast  produced  meat  and grains,  which  they  then 
shipped  by  water  to urban  centers.  And those  who worked the  heavier 
soils  of  the  interior  shifted  out of  arable  production  into  the  production 
of  livestock.  Studies  of  subsistence  crises  also  suggest  the  relatively  greater 
integration  of  the  English  market;  Appleby  and others  indicate  that  there 
was a far  greater  mobility  of  grain  between  regions  of  abundant  harvests 
and those  of dearth  in England than there  was in France, and thus  a 
greater  capacity  to  blunt  the  consequences  of  food  shortages.38 
Major investigations  of  present-day  agriculture  refute  the  position  that 
peasant  agriculture  retards  development.  So do important  reassessments 
of  the  historical  data. 
THE  SQUEEZE  ON  AGRICULTURE 
Viewed in  historical  perspective,  development  is  a process  of  structural 
change.  It  results  from  the  movement  of  resources  land,  labor,  and cap- 
ital-out  of  agriculture  and into  other  sectors,  such as industry,  where 
these  resources  can be used more  productively.  In summary  notation: 
d GNP  dAg./GNP<0 
dt  dt 
where  d stands  for  change,  t for  time,  GNP for  gross  national  product, 
and Ag./GNP  for  agriculture  as a portion  of  the  gross  national  product. 
One way in which  this  shift  of resources  takes  place is through  pro- 
ductivity  increases  in agriculture.  Technical change  in agriculture  leads 
to increased  supplies  of agricultural  products;  because the demand for 
England  1450-1850 (Hamden, CT: Archon  Books,  1977),  and M. Turner,  "Agricultural  Pro- 
ductivity  in  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century:  Evidence  from  Crop  Yields,"  Economic  His- 
tory  Review,  2nd  series,  35 (i982), 489-5Io. 
37See Marjorie  Mackintosh,  "Economic  Change in  Southeast  England,  I350-i600,"  paper 
presented  at  the  Caltech-All  University  of  California  Conference  (fn.  I7). 
38 See Andrew Appleby,  "Grain Prices  and Subsistence  Crises in England and France, 
I 590-I  740Journal  of  Economic History  39  (December  I979), 865-87; E. A. Wrigley and Roger 
Schofield,  The Population  History  of  England I541-i87I  (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press,  i98i); David Weir,  "Markets  and Mortality  in  France,"  i600-I789," manuscript,  n.p., 
n.d.; Joan  Thirsk,  ed.,  Agrarian  History  of  England  and Wales  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  Uni- 
versity  Press,  i984). 
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such  products  is  inelastic,  prices  fall,  and  the  resources  of  land,  labor,  and 
capital  employed  by  marginal  producers  fail  to  earn  revenues  equivalent 
to  their  opportunity  costs,  and  so  seek  productive  employment  elsewhere. 
Through  the  Mills-Marshall  treadmill,  dynamic  transformations  in  ag- 
riculture  lead  to  the  structural  transformation  of  the  greater  economy.39 
Structural  transformation  can  also  be  achieved  by  policy-induced  shifts 
in  relative  prices.  Here,  another  lesson  of  history  is  brought  to  bear:  that 
industrialization  was  achieved  by  shifting  the  terms  of  trade  against  ag- 
riculture.40 
Central  to  this  inference  is  the  history  of  the  Corn  Laws,  and  in  partic- 
ular  their  repeal.  Classical  economists,  especially  Ricardo,  had  attacked 
the  Corn  Laws  and  stressed  the  way  in  which  they  privileged  the  interests 
of  the  landed  classes.  Manufacturers  and  workers  had  combined  in  de- 
manding  their  repeal;  according  to  Marshall,  "the  Victory  of  the  Anti- 
Corn  Law League  signalized  the  extension  of  the  interests  of  industrial 
capitalists  and  of  ... their  rule  over  England."4  From  the  history  of  the 
Corn  Laws,  many  therefore  concluded  that  the  shift  from  an  agrarian  to 
an  industrial  society  could  be  achieved  by  altering  the  terms  of  trade  be- 
tween  town  and  country.42 
This way  of  promoting  industrialization  strongly  appealed  to  ambi- 
tious  elites.  In the  Soviet  Union,  for  example,  some,  like  Bukharin,  fa- 
vored  offering  positive  incentives  to  farmers;  their  response  in  terms  of 
increased  supply  would  then  induce  the  dynamic  adjustments  leading  to 
the  release  of  resources  to  industry.  Others,  like  Preobrazhensky,  dis- 
trusted  the  willingness  and  ability  of  peasants  to  respond  to  price  incen- 
tives;  citing  the  lessons  from  the  history  of  industrialization  in  Britain, 
they  felt  that  forceful  state  intervention  to  shift  the  terms  of  trade  against 
39  See the  excellent  discussion  in  Alain de Janvry,  The  Agrarian  Question  and  Reformism  in 
Latin  America  (Baltimore:  The Johns  Hopkins University  Press,  i98i).  The central  issue  of 
whether  industrialization  resulted  from  the transfer  of resources  from  agriculture  is ad- 
dressed  in Francois  Crouzet,  Capital  Formation  in the  Industrial  Revolution  (London: Me- 
thuen,  I972),  and Roderick  Flood and Donald McClosky,  eds.,  The  Economic  History  of  Brit- 
ain  since  1700, I (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  i98i). 
4? The history  of  these  ideas  is  ably  reviewed  in  Lipton  (fn.  25).  See also  E. Preobrazhensky, 
The  New Economics,  trans.  by  Brian  Pearce  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  i966);  Alexander  Er- 
lich,  The  Soviet  Industrialization  Debates,  1924-i928  (Cambridge:  Harvard University  Press, 
I  960). 
4' Leon S. Marshall,  "The Emergence  of  the  First  Industrial  City:  Manchester  I780-i850," 
in  Caroline  F. Ware,  ed.,  The  Cultural  Approach  to  History  (New York: Columbia University 
Press,  I940),  I58. A sophisticated  treatment  is  provided  by  Timothy  J.  McKeown in  "The Pol- 
itics  of  Corn  Law Repeal  Reconsidered,"  paper  presented  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Amer- 
ican Political  Science Association,  Chicago,  September  3-6, i987.  In this  paper,  McKeown 
reanalyzes  the  famous  Aydelotte  data  set.  See William  Aydelotte,  "The Country  Gentlemen 
and the  Repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws,"  English  Historical  Review  82 (i967),  47-60. 
42 See in particular  Ashok Mitra,  Terms  of  Trade  and Class  Relations:  An  Essay  in Political 
Economy  (London: Frank  Cass,  I977). 
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agriculture  represented  the  best  policy.  The advocates  of  political  inter- 
vention  won out; by  shifting  the  structure  of  relative  prices  against  rural 
producers,  they  taxed  the  rural  sector  in favor  of  industry.43  This policy 
was subsequently  followed  by  others.44 
Although  it  is now widely  recognized  that  turning  the  terms  of  trade 
against  agriculture  is  far  more  likely  to  lead to  stagnation  than  to  growth, 
this  lesson  of  history  was used for  decades to  advocate  and to justify  the 
imposition  of  negative  pricing  policies  on farmers. 
Because reasoning  from  precedent  will remain  an important  guide to 
policy  in  the  development  field,  we are  motivated  to  reassess  the  historical 
record.  When we do so,  we learn  three  new  lessons.  The first  is that  the 
repeal  of  the  Corn Laws represented  the  repeal  of  a subsidy  rather  than 
the  imposition  of  a tax;  structural  transformation  had thus  been  achieved 
where agriculture  was subsidized rather  than  squeezed. The second is 
that  the development  field  has drawn historical  lessons  from  a highly 
anomalous  case; it  therefore  rests  upon  unfirm  data.  The third  is  the  cen- 
trality  of  politics  to  the  economics  of  development. 
LESSON  ONE 
When re-assessing  the  historical  precedents  that  proved  to  be mislead- 
ing guides to policy,  one quickly  recognizes  that  the  repeal  of  the  Corn 
Laws did not  represent  the  imposition  of  a tax  on agriculture.  The policy 
of  the  British  government  can be summarized  as choosing  that  price  for 
farm  products  which  represents  the 
max  (Pd,  Pw) 
where  Pd  is the price  on the domestic  market  and P,  the price  on the 
world  market.  Under  the  terms  of  the  Corn Laws, when  the  world  price 
was higher  than  the  domestic  price,  farmers  could export  grain;  when it 
was lower  than  the  domestic  price,  imports  were  prohibited.  The policy 
thus  represented  a high-price  policy,  which favored  farmers  at the ex- 
pense  of  consumer  interests. 
It  is  ironic  that,  rather  than  justifying  the  policy  prescription  ofshifting  the 
terms  of  trade  against  farming,  the  English  case  justifies  the  opposite.  The 
structural  transformation  of  English  agriculture  took  place in  the  context 
of  policies  that  protected  high  agricultural  prices. 
43See  Erlich (fn.  40),  as well  as Maurice  Dobb,  Soviet  Economic  Development  Since 1917 
(New York: International  Publishers,  I948). 
44 See the discussion  in Theodore W. Schultz,  ed.,  Distortions  of  Agricultural  Incentives 
(Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1978). 
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LESSON Two 
As Heckscher  and others  point  out,  England's commitment  to  policies 
favoring  farmers  made that  nation  unique in its  time.  A key  element  of 
"mercantilist  policies,"  Heckscher  suggests,  was "provisioning":  supply- 
ing cheap grain  to urban  centers.  Other  governments  intervened  to de- 
fend  low domestic  prices  by banning  the export  of grain when world 
prices  were higher  than  the  domestic  price,  and by  allowing  the  import 
of  grain  when  domestic  prices  were  high.  They acted,  in  other  words,  to 
implement  policies  which  selected  the 
m'  (Pd,  PJ.41 
The  policies  everywhere  else  in  Europe  were  exactly  the  opposite  of  those  fol- 
lowed  in  England. 
It is important  to stress  the level of English exceptionalism.  Econo- 
mists,  Marxist  and otherwise,  have long  taken  the  English  case as proto- 
typical  of  early  industrialization.  Many  of  the  lessons  inferred  about the 
origins  of successful  capitalist  development  derive  from  this  case. And 
yet,  as we have  seen,  England proves  to  have  been  anomalous. 
French  policies  toward  agriculture  were  more  characteristic  of  those  of 
her  historical  contemporaries;  they  were  also more typical  of  those  that 
characterize  the  developing  nations  today.  French  agriculture  was peas- 
ant-based;  productivity  was relatively  low; the  government  adhered to  a 
low-price  policy;  and it  maintained  a bureaucracy  to secure  cheap grain 
to  feed  its  civil  servants,  its  armed  forces,  and its  capital  city.  The French 
case  not  the  English,  with  its  large  farms,  subsidized  rural  sector,  and 
relatively  free  internal  trade  better  approximates  the  world  of  the  con- 
temporary  developing  nations.  Thus, it  follows  that  too  much  theorizing 
about development  has been based on the  case of  England,  and too little 
on that  of  France. 
Development  specialists  would do well  to  put  aside their  Marx,  Smith, 
Ricardo, and Mill and instead  consult  the writings  on France, such as 
those  produced  by  Tilly,  Brenner,  Root,  and Kaplan. 
LESSON  THREE 
The third  lesson  leads  to  a renewed  respect  for  the  centrality  of  politics 
to  the  economics  of  development. 
England,  like  every  other  developing  country,  originally  intervened  in 
agricultural  markets  in an effort  to defend consumer  interests.  Gras, 
45Eli  F. Heckscher,  Merchantilism,  II (London: George  Allen  & Unwin,  I93i),  8off. 
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Ponko, Outhwaite,  and others  have examined  the  process  by  which  the 
government  sought to regulate  the grain trade so as to preserve  low 
prices.46  The frequency  of such interventions  declined in the I7th cen- 
tury,  however,  and policy  was reversed  in i688, with  the  adoption  of  the 
Corn Laws.47  As Kaplan, Tilly, and others  show, the government  in 
France,  by  contrast,  continued  to  intervene  in grain  markets  in order  to 
preserve  lower,  not  higher,  grain  prices. 
One reason for  the  disparate  behavior  of the two governments  may 
have  been  the  relative  security  of  food  supplies.  The data suggest  that,  by 
the I7th century,  food  shortages  were less  frequent  in England than  in 
France; there  were  fewer  subsistence  crises.  Just  as government  policy  af- 
fected  the  performance  of  the  agrarian  economy,  so the  performance  of 
the  economy  may  have  affected  the  incentives  for  governments  to  assure 
the  supply  of  low-cost  food.48  There is a strong  case to be made for  the 
significance  of  this  reciprocal  causation. 
The books  reviewed  in  this  essay  also  suggest,  however,  that  there  may 
have been important  political  reasons  for  the  contrast  in public policies. 
Root,  Brenner,  Tilly,  and Kaplan argue  that  agricultural  policy  in  France 
was driven  in part  by  the  need for  revenues  to  finance  foreign  wars  and 
in part  by  the  need to  achieve  internal  security.  The English  monarchy, 
too,  needed money  for  its  foreign  wars; but,  in the  I7th  century,  the  do- 
mestic  threat  to  it  came not  so much  from  the  capital  city  as from  parlia- 
ment. 
Viewed from  this  vantage  point,  the  date  of  the  Corn Laws  the  hall- 
mark  of  English  exceptionalism  is  instructive.  The laws were  passed  in 
i688 as part  of the terms  negotiated  between  parliament  and the king 
who had been chosen  by  parliament:  William of Orange.49  Parliament 
had overthrown  the  monarchy;  it  had ruled  England for  decades; and by 
turning  to  William and Mary,  it  had imported  a new royal  family.  The 
landowners  who dominated  parliament  sought  the  commitment  of the 
monarch to policies that  would raise the price of grain; the monarch 
46 N.S.B. Gras,  The  Evolution  of  the  English  Corn  Market  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  Univer- 
sity  Press,  I9I5);  V. Ponko,  "N.S.B. Gras  and Elizabethan  Corn  Policy:  A Re-examination  of 
the Problem,"  Economic  History  Review,  2nd series,  I7 (i964), 24-42; R. B. Outhwaite, 
"Dearth  and Government  Intervention  in  English  Grain  Markets,  I590-I700,"  Economic  His- 
tory  Review,  2nd  series,  34 (i981),  380-406,  and "Food Crises  in  Early  Modern  England: Pat- 
terns  of  Public Response,"  in  Proceedings  of  the  Seventeenth  International  History  Conference, 
ed. Michael  Flinn  (Edinburgh:  The University  Press,  I978). 
47  See the  discussion  in Adam Smith,  The Wealth  of  Nations  (Chicago: University  of  Chi- 
cago Press,  I976), Book I,  pp. 2I9ff. 
48 See,  for  example,  Weir  (fn.  38); the  contributions  in  Robert  I. Rotberg  and Theodore K. 
Rabb,  Hunger  and  History  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  i985); and Appleby  (fn. 
38). 
49  See Smith  (fn.  47),  Book I, pp.  2I9ff. 
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sought  higher  taxes.  The  result  was  a political  compromise.  The  king  ex- 
changed  protection  of  the  economic  interests  of  grain  producers  for  par- 
liament's  agreement  to  a land  tax.  The landed  elites  and the  monarch 
adopted  a program  of  agrarian  protection  and  split  the  economic  benefits 
between  them. 
Why,  then,  did  not  London  rebel,  as Paris  did?50  Brenner's  new  re- 
search  shows  that  the  governing  elites  in  London  differed  significantly 
from  those  in  Paris.5'  London  was  a port  city,  and  its  government  was 
dominated  not  by  civil  servants  and  lawyers,  but  by  merchants  and  trad- 
ers.  The elites  of  Paris  were  consumers  of  grain;  those  of  London  were 
traders.  Unlike  their  Parisian  counterparts,  those  who  dominated  the 
government  of  London  could  benefit  from  the  exportation  of  grain;  free 
trade  in  grain  therefore  was  less  of  a threat  to  the  powerful  in  the  capital 
city. 
Kaplan's  study  of  the  politics  of  agricultural  policy  in  France  demon- 
strates  that  the  coastal  cities  joined  the  landed  classes  in  demanding  the 
liberalization  of  the  grain  trade.  London  was  a coastal  city.  Had the  cap- 
ital  of  France  been  Marseille  rather  than  Paris,  the  monarchy  of  France 
in  the  i8th  century  might  well  have  shifted  to  market  principles  in  the 
making  of  agricultural  policy. 
CONCLUSION 
In  this  essay,  we  have  examined  five  recent  works  that  cast  light  upon 
the  foundations  of  the  development  field.  To a great  extent,  those  foun- 
dations  are  based  on  lessons  of  history  that  have  not  been  properly  inter- 
preted. 
Several  of  the  central  theses  about  the  transition  from  agrarianism  rest 
on debatable  grounds.  For  example,  the  nation-state  did  not  champion 
the  extension  of  competitive  markets;  rather,  public  officials  sought  to 
limit  and regulate  them.  It was the  workers  and burghers the  new 
classes  that  emerged  with  capitalism who  used  the  language  of  com- 
munity  to  resist  the  market;  often,  it  was  agricultural  producers  who  pre- 
ferred  unfettered  trade.  Peasants  often  sought  to break  up commons; 
elites  often  sought  to  preserve  them.  Small-scale  farmers  accounted  for 
much  of  the  productivity  gains  in the  period  preceding  the  Industrial 
Revolution;  peasant  agriculture  was  not  stagnant.  Moreover,  deep  mis- 
5-  As Rude has  shown,  the  rebellions  by  the  London  mob  correlated  with  the  price  of  bread. 
See Rude (fn.  8). 
5 Robert  Brenner,  forthcoming. 
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understandings  surround  the  history  of  the  terms  of trade  and the  role 
they  played  in "the  great  transformation." 
Among  the  most  significant  of  the  new  lessons  learned,  however,  is  the 
intellectual  tyranny  of  the  English  case  and the  significance  of  that  of 
France. 
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